Dedicated to Christian converts from Islam, who have contributed so much to the Kingdom of God and the Church, who have ministered, physically and spiritually, among their Muslim brothers and sisters, who have died as martyrs for confessing Jesus the Messiah as their Saviour and Lord.

Jesus said:

How blest you are, when you suffer insults and persecution and every kind of calumny for my sake. Accept it with gladness and exultation, for you have a rich reward in heaven; in the same way they persecuted the prophets before you. (Matt. 5:11,12)

A.   Why This Translation

Why the need to translate Abul Ala Mawdudi's book The Punishment of the Apostate according to Islamic Law?[1] Here are two reasons.

1. The Islamic law of apostasy is a symptom of a strong and pervasive traditional Muslim attitude, religious and political, toward non-Muslims and the non-Islamic world. Despite the legal pronouncement of Islam upon Salman Rushdie the West has hardly recognized the law of apostasy in Islam. It is imperative that Westerners, especially with the intensifying orthodox Islamic revival throughout the world and the continued growth of Muslim presence in the West, become more familiar with this law also.

2. Abul Ala Mawdudi has been one of the most influential religious thinkers of the Muslim World in the 20th century. His presentation of the subject is an unusually full and lucid exposition of the theological and legal foundations of the traditional understanding of the law of apostasy and its punishment in Islam and a contemporary rational justification for its continued implementation.

It is hoped that the following points will further elucidate a rationale for the translation of Mawdudi's book and provide a fuller context for a wider discussion on the subject:

1. Many Muslims disagree with Abul Ala Mawdudi's understanding and argumentation. In fact, Mawdudi's book indicates serious doubt of other Muslims (at least on the Indian subcontinent) about the validity and integrity of the law and the main issues at stake: a. the actual meaning of apostasy; b. its presence and significance in the Qur'an; c. the relation of Qur'an 2:256 ("There is no compulsion in religion") to the law. This particular verse is central to the more liberal exposition of the law of apostasy found in the former Chief Justice of Pakistan, S. A. Rahman's book Punishment of Apostasy in Islam[2], in which he castigates the traditionalists' abuse of the sources of Islam (the Qur'an and the Hadith). Still, virtually all Muslims in the East who possess any serious grasp of early Islamic history recognize the law of apostasy and its implementation as far back as Abu Bakr's wars in Arabia against the Arabs who wished to secede from the Muslim community shortly after Muhammad's death and the pervasive influence of this law throughout Islamic history up to the present.

2. On occasions in the past, no doubt, Muslims have moderated the penalty for the law of apostasy, whether because of external or internal political pressures or other reasons. No doubt, in past and present some converts have left Islam for Christianity (or other religions) and lived as Christians with little or no obvious Muslim opposition. Even fewer have been executed.

Nevertheless it is also true that in various parts of the world converts -- their numbers are significant -- have endured persecutions physically and psychologically, at times violently. The techniques are varied. Some converts are tortured. Few in traditional Muslim countries escape unscathed. At times even the convert's Muslim family members are subjected to severe harassment to induce the convert to return to Islam. The persecution emanates from governments, officially or unofficially, from Muslim communities, or simply from one or two zealous individuals, possibly a relative and even a father, intent on taking the law into his own hands when he thinks the government or community has failed to do its job. Even some converts from Islam in the West exercise caution in Muslim circles, fearing possible retaliation upon themselves or even their families in their native lands, while, paradoxically, converts to Islam in the West (from Christianity, Judaism, another religion or no religion) boldly and with no need to fear announce their conversion privately and publicly and extol the virtues of Islam, including its freedom!

3. People from the East, Muslim and non-Muslim minorities and Westerners who have spent time in Muslim countries are aware of the law of apostasy. But otherwise how many Westerners are aware that it even exists, not to speak about its nature and history? Or, given an awareness of its existence, does it exist simply as an aberration of Islam? Is it possibly a later accretion with no roots in Islamic sources, perhaps even a figment of Western imperialist and missionary imagination, another false allegation of "the Orientalists"?

If Westerners are interested in International Human Rights, including Muslim expressions of human rights, they will be interested in the law of apostasy and Mawdudi's exposition of it in this work.[3] Diplomats and other personnel concerned with immigration and refugees may find it illuminating, probably even more so since (if our limited evidence is at all indicative) many immigration officials seem unfamiliar with it. If our government documentation centres provide basic information on the persecution of Baha'is and Ahmadis, do they provide something comparable on the persecution of Jews and Christians living as minorities among Muslims? If not, is it because Christians have not provided them with the information?

Are Christians in the West, in fact, concerned with such problems? Should they be? If documentation centres are devoid of information about Muslim apostates who have become Christians, does this reflect the Western Christian Church's ignorance? Or, assuming church awareness, is the plight of the convert a possible inconvenience and even embarrassment to the church, especially a church whose great priority in its relations with other religions has become simply reconciliation between religions or peoples of different religions rather than the proclamation of God's reconciliation with humankind through His Messiah? Is the suffering of converts, converts to Christianity also, because of conversion a concern of the ecumenical Church? Occasionally one hears of Muslim surprise about (= disdain for?) Christians who appear indifferent toward their persecuted Christian brothers and sisters. Did not early Christian worship regularly include remembrance of the martyrs and other Christians suffering for their faith, as they also shared in the Eucharist in remembrance of the Messiah's suffering and death?

Though there are Muslims in the West who are aware and supportive of Islam's law of apostasy, it is hardly surprising that they talk little about it. On the other hand many Muslims concerned with Islam's image in the West vehemently insist that Islam proclaims religious tolerance and freedom, as if the law of apostasy never existed or is now obsolete. Do they know the law of apostasy, its sources, its history, its current implementation? Is it that they, to paraphrase Mawdudi, have removed it from the rule book because it is inconvenient to keep it in the West?

Like the Islamic pronouncement upon Salman Rushdie, the law of apostasy is not simply "an obscene edict from a fanatic sect in Islam".[4] It has a profound connection with Islamic source materials, with all traditional Sunni and Shi'i Islamic legal schools, with Islamic history since its inception. Its legality is a contentious issue in some nations today. Many able and sophisicated Muslim leaders and thinkers justify it and call for its revival and implementation. In short the law of apostasy in Islam is not just a relic of the past but quite alive and well.

B.   Why This Translation: A Personal Note (Syed Silas Husain)

Until recently I had never felt the need for documentary evidence to understand Islam's traditional punishment for apostasy. Since the time of my conversion from Islam to Christianity in India about three decades ago, I have personally experienced its intention and direction through verbal and physical persecution, including two attempts on my life by Muslims who believed that an apostate from Islam should be killed. (By what Islamic standard did they measure themselves to be qualified to assume this responsibility?)

But sharing such experiences with others carries no guarantee that others will accept the truth of these experiences. After all, do not all religions teach us to do good to others, at least not to harm them?

It was only a few years ago that a few friends and I sought authoritative evidence in English to encourage Canadian Immigration officials to help stop the deportation of a convert from Islam back to his Muslim homeland. Where was this hard evidence to be found? To my surprise no Muslim publisher or bookstore seemed to have anything on the subject in English. My letters to Muslim theological schools and propagation centres in West Asia, India, Pakistan and South Africa brought no response, apart from a reply from Qom in Iran which stated that no literature on apostasy in English existed and that I should beware of Western propaganda. The immigration officials with whom I was in contact appeared to be unaware of, or to ignore or even dismiss, the consequences of apostasy from Islam. I had to continue looking for written evidence to establish for others the credibility of even my own experience!

On the other hand, to know that many Muslims today uphold the traditional Islamic law of apostasy and its punishment in Islam is not to suggest that all Muslims everywhere thirst for the blood of apostates from Islam. Many of us converts remain alive and well and normally move freely among Muslims, especially in countries such as India and Canada -- though we may be uneasy about travelling in some Muslim countries. We gladly attend festival celebrations, weddings and funerals, aqiqah and circumcision ceremonies.

We come to these gatherings, of course, because relatives and friends have kindly invited us. And we are grateful for these opportunities. We do not come to abuse Islam, to blaspheme Muhammad and the Qur'an, to undermine government and society. Nor have we become Christians for these purposes. In fact Muslim friends and relatives continue to communicate with us; some may even solicit our counsel and our prayers for themselves and for their families. Are they tolerant toward us because they are less Muslim than they should be, or because they are unfamiliar with traditional Islamic law and practice, or they simply focus on Qur'an 2:256 ("There is no compulsion in religion") or they respect the laws of their nation, living and letting live? Whatever the reason, we thank God for Muslim brothers and sisters who remain tolerant toward us.

Still, we naturally do have concerns about Muslims whose attitudes and actions have been shaped by Islam's traditional law of apostasy. What this law is all about and how it has been understood, what its sources and purpose are, are competently presented in Abul Ala Mawdudi's book, The Punishment of the Apostate in Islam. The author's extensive apology for its contemporary validity and his own remarkable influence throughout the Muslim world only enhance the value of his presentation. Could we have chosen a better book or author to explain Islam's law of apostasy and its punishment as masses of Muslims throughout the world have understood it and continue to understand it -- and at the same time to explain our own apprehension about this law and its punishments, particularly when we are in company with Muslims we do not know? To initiate further discussions on this topic we have introduced the opinions of some Muslims who represent greater tolerance.

Our purpose in translating Mawdudi's book is thus not to malign Islam. Rather it is, firstly, to present something which Muslims consider authentic on the subject for Christians, especially those sharing the Christian Gospel with Muslims, so that Christians may begin to grasp the cost which a convert from Islam may have to pay to live as a disciple of Jesus the Messiah, to learn to pray for the convert and to be ready to help him, protect him and even suffer for him and with him. The convert who may be unfamiliar with the law of apostasy should also, of course, be instructed about it. Secondly, this translation is to remind Muslim missionaries and those whom they invite to enter the House of Islam, to note Mawdudi's pertinent admonition about careless decisions in becoming a Muslim. To enter the fold may be easier than to exit. Is the law of apostasy a part of the Muslim missionary's da'wah, his invitation to non-Muslims to become Muslims?

Finally we hope that this translation will help national and international organizations interested in human rights and refugees to better understand the plight of those persons in many Muslim nations who have converted from Islam to another religion and no longer feel safe where they currently reside.

C.   About Abul Ala Mawdudi

Remembering Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) is to remember a twentieth century Pakistani deeply immersed in the planning and formation of Pakistan, and as much in the revival and renewal of Islam not only on the Asian subcontinent but throughout the whole Muslim world. Remembering him is to remember his strong opposition to British rule in India, his unwillingness to cooperate with Mahatma Gandhi and Indian nationalist movements, even his rejection of the nationalist motivations of other Muslim movements for the independence of India and the formation of Pakistan. Remembering him is to remember a man passionately devoted to Islam, ready not only to talk but to act and suffer on behalf of his faith, convinced of its superiority over all religions and desirous that it be practised again as it was manifested in its purity during the time of Muhammad and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs for the welfare of all mankind.

Charles Adams offers us an excellent summary of his significance for Islam and Pakistan:

In his introduction as translator and editor of Mawdudi's Toward Understanding Islam, Khurshid Ahmad writes about Mawdudi:

Toward Understanding Islam itself is a clear indication of Mawdudi's powerful and extensive influence in promoting the cause of Islam. It was originally published in Urdu in 1932 as a textbook for students and for the general public. It has been translated also into Arabic, Hindi, Persian, German, French, Italian, Turkish, Portuguese, Swahili, Indonesian, Japanese, Malayalam, Tamil, Pashtu, Bengali, Gujarati and Sindhi. In all these languages over a million copies have appeared.[7]

Surely it speaks volumes for Mawdudi's popularity and authority that he provides an Introduction to A. Yusuf Ali's The Holy Qur'an, Translation and Commentary.[8]

In "A Bibliography of Writings By and About Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi" Qazi Zulqadr Siddiqi, S. M. Aslam and M. M. Ahsan cite 138 works written by Mawdudi and 62 writings about him.[9] They also note translations into other languages apart from Urdu and English: Arabic, Bengali, Danish, French, Gujarati, German, Hindi, Hausa, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Pashtu, Portuguese, Persian, Sindhi, Swahili, Telugu, Tamil, Turkish. In the list of 138 works Murtadd ki Saza Islami Qanun men (The Punishment of the Apostate according to Islamic Law), Lahore, 1953 is also noted on p. 8. Apparently this work has never been translated into English or any other language.

D.   Translating and Editing Concerns

No doubt, there is room for improving our translation. Still, we would contend that this translation, perhaps at the expense of elegance, accurately reproduces what Mawdudi has written. We welcome corrections, of course!

A glossary is provided at the end of this work. This allows for explanations for some technical vocabulary also which, it seems, is better preserved in its original language in the translated text.

A number of Appendices have been included. Appendix A appears as an extended Note in Mawdudi's original text. The others, it is hoped, demonstrate the reality of the law of apostasy and its punishment and the variety of opinions on the subject under discussion and related matters held by responsible Muslim scholars and/or Muslim community leaders.

E. Anticipating Some Readers' Thoughts

May we briefly bring the following matters to the readers' attention:

1. In one sense the content of Mawdudi's work covers more than the title suggests. This is evident even from his Preface, which has reference also to the question of the Islamic legality of non-Muslims propagating their religions particularly in countries predominantly Muslim. It has been included in the translation simply because Mawdudi included it in his original text and because it will be of interest to many Muslims and non-Muslims.

2. In another sense Mawdudi (unfortunately?) limits his topic to the penal consequences of apostasy. A complete understanding of apostasy must also consider the civil consequences of apostasy as related to matters such as marriage, property, wills and inheritance as expressed unanimously or variously by the different Islamic schools of law in the past and present. Just as significantly it must reckon more seriously with the nature of apostasy itself, with a variety of past and present Muslim interpretations of apostasy, with apostasy not only with reference to the apostate's new point of allegiance but with apostasy simply as renouncing Islam.[10]

3. Our intention in translating and annotating Mawdudi's work is not to exalt Christianity at the expense of Islam, to forget those sordid chapters and episodes in Christendom's history of intolerance and persecution (of Muslims also), to ignore the present commission of injustice and the omission of justice by Christians in the world today, sins all the more flagrant in the light of the Messiah's teachings and His personal implementation of His teachings.

4. Our concern, in indicating various Muslim responses to the law of apostasy and its punishment in Islam, is not to decide for Muslims which interpretation is correct or which is appropriate for Muslim belief and practice today. Though our preference as Christians is obvious, we are aware that Muslims themselves must make these decisions. Still, we would venture to repeat that able, intelligent, Islamically informed and committed Muslims hold significantly different and dramatically opposed opinions on the subject, a fact which should be recognized and not ignored by Muslims as well as non-Muslims.

Should not the whole topic of religious tolerance and intolerance, in fact, be aired more freely, especially because of the unprecedented intermingling of different religious communities today? Surely all religious communities must review their attitudes not only toward their fellow believers but also toward the followers of other religions. Would it then be possible for Muslims and Christians together to consider their attitudes toward those of the other community and even toward those who have left their community to join the other community?

Syed Silas Husain

Ernest Hahn Mississauga, Canada

Notes

1. Originally published in Urdu as Murtadd ki Saza Islami Qanun men. The edition available to us was published by Islamic Publishers Ltd., Lahore, 1963.

2. Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1972.

3. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991. She writes with reference to apostasy: "The Islamic human rights schemes... are evasive on the question of protections for freedom of religion.... The failure of a single one of these Islamic human rights schemes to take a position against the application of the shari'a death penalty for apostasy means that the authors of these schemes have neglected to confront and resolve the main issues involved in harmonizing international human rights and shari'a standards." (pp.186, 187)

Arij A. Roest Crollius (in Wie tolerant ist der Islam ed. Walter Kerber, Kindt Verlag, Muenchen, 1991, p. 42) illustrates more clearly the basic presupposition of the different charters: "A significant difference between the United Nations' Charter (of Human Rights) and the Islamic Declaration (of Human Rights) of 1981 is the starting point: the Charter is based on the dignity of the individual human being, while the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights is founded on the Qur'an and Hadith. Thus the shari'ah is the foundation of this Charter and is presupposed by it. The United Nations' Charter has a starting point which is seen as valid for all mankind, i.e., the dignity of human nature. The portrayal of man which is presupposed in the Islamic Declaration is the Islamic portrayal of man. Against this the United Nations' Charter indeed does not exclude a religiously inspired portrayal of man; still, it acknowledges none among the religions. In 1981 the General Assembly of the United Nations accepted a declaration eliminating any form of intolerance and discrimination on the basis of religion or faith. It is thus not easy to understand how such a declaration may be compatible with the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights."

For a summary of this general contrast between International Human Rights statements and Islamic Rights statements see Patrick Sookhdeo, The Law of Apostasy in Islam and Its Relation to Human Rights and Religious Liberty, an unpublished paper presented at the Glen Eyrie Consultation on the Persecuted Church in the Muslim World, 1992, pp. 11-15.

4. Globe and Mail, Toronto, a letter to the editor. I have misplaced the reference and date.

5. Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State" in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John Esposito, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 99. For further information on Mawdudi see Charles Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi" in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. Donald P. Smith, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966; cf. W. C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957, esp. pp. 233-237.

6. The Islamic Foundation, U.K., 8th printing in 1988, p. 13.

7. ibid., pp. 15, 16.

8. American Trust Publications for The Muslim Students' Association, 2nd edition, 1977. Mawdudi's "Introduction" covers 21 pages. A. Yusuf Ali's Preface to the first edition of this popular translation and commentary originated in Lahore and is dated 1934. However Mawdudi's contribution is not found in the 4th edition, now entitled The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an, Amana Corporation, Bentwood, 1992 and described as a "new edition with revised translation and commentary".

9. In Islamic Perspectives, Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l A'la Mawdudi, ed. Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, The Islamic Foundation, U.K. in association with Saudi Publishing House, Jeddah, 1979, pp. 3-14.

10. For a useful discussion on the whole topic of apostasy in Islam, including apostasy's civil consequences, see Rudolph Peters and Gert J. J. De Vries, "Apostasy in Islam" in Die Welt des Islams, (Brill, Leiden, Vol. XVII, 1976-77), pp. 1-25. See also The Hedaya, tr. Charles Hamilton, Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, Vol. II, pp. 228-246 and Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar, tr. by Khadduri, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966, pp. 195-229. Shaybani (A.D. 750-804) was a disciple of Abu Hanifah. Peters and De Vries briefly refer to legal and illegal ways to execute the apostate. (op. cit., p. 5)

The Punishment of the Apostate according to Islamic Law

Publisher's Request

At present the evil of apostasy has spread extensively among Muslims because they are unfamiliar with their religion. In view of this fact there is an urgency now as never before to present the actual injunctions of Islam related to this problem.

Mawlana Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi, recognized as a well known and competent scholar throughout the Muslim world, has fully covered and clarified all aspects of this problem. He has dealt with the matter convincingly and effectively from both the revelational and the rational perspectives. He has demonstrated the perfection of the Islamic teaching on the subject and has effectively countered the objections raised by Islam's opponents. This valuable book should be distributed widely now in order to save Muslims unfamiliar with the subject from this terrible evil.

Three editions of this book have been previously published. Even then, the book has not been available for a period of time. We are publishing the fourth edition by offset in a more attractive format. It is our firm hope that our kind readers will enjoy this new edition and will co-operate in giving it as wide a distribution as previous editions received.

A.H. 22 Muharram, 1383 A.D. 25 June, 1963

Respectfully Akhlaq Husain, General Manager Islamic Publications Ltd., Lahore

Preface by the Author

This brief essay was written originally in response to a question and was published in the October 1942 to June 1943 issue of the magazine Tarjuman al-Qur'an. Since the topic deals with a very contentious problem in Islamic law and has created a disturbance in the hearts of most people, this essay is now presented as a separate publication.

The question alluded to above was as follows:

Two matters in the question require clarification:

1. What are the authentic injunctions of Islam regarding the execution of an apostate and religious propagation by non-Muslim communities?

2. What arguments do we have which will satisfy us and which, we expect, will satisfy others that these injunctions are rational?

Both of these matters are discussed on the following pages.

To everyone acquainted with Islamic law it is no secret that according to Islam the punishment for a Muslim who turns to kufr (infidelity, blasphemy) is execution. Doubt about this matter first arose among Muslims during the final portion of the nineteenth century as a result of speculation. Otherwise, for the full twelve centuries prior to that time the total Muslim community remained unanimous about it. The whole of our religious literature clearly testifies that ambiguity about the matter of the apostate's execution never existed among Muslims. The expositions of the Prophet, the Rightly-Guided Caliphs (Khulafa'-i Rashidun), the great Companions (Sahaba) of the Prophet, their Followers (Tabi'un), the leaders among the mujtahids and, following them, the doctors of the shari'ah of every century are available on record. All these collectively will assure you that from the time of the Prophet to the present day one injunction only has been continuously and uninterruptedly operative and that no room whatever remains to suggest that perhaps the punishment of the apostate is not execution.

Some people have been influenced by the so-called enlightenment of the present age to the point that they have opened the door to contrary thoughts on such proven issues. Their daring is truly very astonishing. They have not considered that if doubts arise even about such matters which are supported by such a continuous and unbroken series of witnesses, this state of affairs will not be confined to one or two problems. Hereafter anything whatever of a past age which has come down to us through verbal tradition will not be protected from doubt, be it the Qur'an or ritual prayer (namaz) or fasting (roza). It will come to the point that even Muhammad's mission to this world will be questioned. In fact a more reasonable way for these people, rather than creating doubt of this kind, would have been to accept as fact what is fact and is proven through certified witnesses, and then to consider whether or not to follow the religion which punishes the apostate by death. The person who discovers any established or wholesome element of his religion to conflict with his intellectual standards and then tries to prove that this element is not really a part of the religion, already proves that his affliction is such that, "You cannot become a kafir (infidel); since there is no other choice, become a Muslim" (kafer natavani shod nachar Musalman sho). In other words, though his manner of thought and outlook has deviated from the true path of his religion, he insists on remaining in it only because he has inherited it from his forefathers.

A. The Proof from the Qur'an for the Commandment to Execute the Apostate

Here I wish briefly to offer proof that will quiet the doubt in the hearts of those who, for lack of sources of information, may think that perhaps the punishment of death did not exist in Islam but was added at a later time by the "mawlawis" (religious leaders) on their own.

God Most High declares in the Qur'an:

The following is the occasion for the revelation of this verse: During the pilgrimage (hajj) in A.H. 9 God Most High ordered a proclamation of an immunity. By virtue of this proclamation all those who, up to that time, were fighting against God and His Apostle and were attempting to obstruct the way of God's religion through all kinds of excesses and false covenants, were granted from that time a maximum respite of four months. During this period they were to ponder their own situation. If they wanted to accept Islam, they could accept it and they would be forgiven. If they wanted to leave the country, they could leave. Within this fixed period nothing would hinder them from leaving. Thereafter those remaining, who would neither accept Islam nor leave the country, would be dealt with by the sword. In this connection it was said: "If they repent and uphold the practice of prayer and almsgiving, then they are your brothers in religion. If after this, however, they break their covenant, then war should be waged against the leaders of kufr (infidelity). Here "covenant breaking" in no way can be construed to mean "breaking of political covenants". Rather, the context clearly determines its meaning to be "confessing Islam and then renouncing it". Thereafter the meaning of "fight the heads of disbelief" (9:11,12) can only mean that war should be waged against the leaders instigating apostasy.[2]

B. Proof from the Hadith (Canonical Tradition) for the Commandment to Execute the Apostate

After the Qur'an we turn to the Hadith. This is the command of the Prophet:

1. Any person (i.e., Muslim) who has changed his religion, kill him.[3]

This tradition has been narrated by Abu Bakr, Uthman, Ali, Muadh ibn Jabal, Abu Musa Ashari, Abdullah ibn Abbas, Khalid ibn Walid and a number of other Companions, and is found in all the authentic Hadith collections.

2. Abdullah ibn Masud reports:

3. Aisha reports:

4. Uthman reports:

Uthman further reports:

All the reliable texts of history clearly prove that Uthman, while standing on the roof of his home, recited this tradition before thousands of people at a time when rebels had surrounded his house and were ready to kill him. His argument against the rebels was based on the point of this tradition that apart from these three crimes it was unlawful to put a Muslim to death for a fourth crime, "and I have committed none of these three. Hence after killing me, you yourself will be found guilty." It is evident that in this way this tradition became a clear argument in favour of Uthman against the rebels. Had there been the slightest doubt about the genuineness of this tradition, hundreds of voices would have cried out: "Your statement is false or doubtful!" But not even one person among the whole gathering of the rebels could raise an objection against the authenticity of this tradition.

5. Abu Musa Ashari reports:

It should be noted that this incident took place during the blessed life of the Prophet. At that time Abu Musa represented the Prophet as governor and Muadh as vice-governor. If their action had not been based on the decision of God and His Messenger, surely the Prophet would have objected.

6. Abdullah ibn Abbas reports:

We find the commentary on this last incident in the narration of Sad ibn Abi Waqqas:

7. Aisha narrates:

8. Jabir ibn Abdullah narrates:

A second report of Bayhaqi with reference to this reads:

C. The Views of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs

After the above I note the views during the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs:

1. During the time of Abu Bakr a woman named Umm Qarfa became a kafir after accepting Islam. Abu Bakr requested that she repent but she did not. Abu Bakr had her put to death.[13]

2. Amru ibn al-As, the governor of Egypt, wrote to Umar that a man accepted Islam, then became a kafir, then accepted Islam and then became a kafir. He committed this act several times. Now should his Islam be accepted or not? Umar replied: As long as God has accepted his Islam, you too should do so. Offer him Islam. If he accepts it, leave him alone. Otherwise kill him.[14]

3. Sad ibn Abi Waqqas and Abu Musa Ashari sent a messenger to Umar after the Battle of Tustar. The messenger presented a report of the events to Umar. Finally Umar asked: Did anything unusual happen? He said: Yes, Leader of the Faithful. We caught an Arab who had become a kafir after accepting Islam. Umar asked: Then what did you do with him? He said: We killed him. At that, Umar said: Why did you not confine him to a room, put a lock on the door, keep him there for three days and daily throw him a loaf of bread? Perhaps during that time he may have repented. O God! This act did not take place at my command or in my presence; nor after hearing about it am I pleased with it. Nevertheless Umar enquired no further about the matter from Sad and Abu Musa Ashari, nor did he plan to punish them.[15]

This proves that the action of Sad and Abu Musa was indeed within the limits of the law, but that in Umar's opinion it would have been much better to have given the person an opportunity to repent before killing him.

4. Abdullah ibn Masud was informed that in one of the mosques of the Banu Hanifah some people were testifying that Musaylimah was a messenger of God. Hearing this, Abdullah sent police to arrest and bring them. When they were brought before him, they all repented and promised never to do it again. Abdullah let all of them go except one, Abdullah ibn al-Nawahah, whom he punished by death. The people said: How is it that you have given two conflicting verdicts in the same case? Abdullah replied that Ibn al-Nawahah was the very man who has been sent by Musaylimah as an ambassador to the Prophet (Muhammad). I was present at that time. Another man, Hajar ibn Wathal, was also with him as a partner in this diplomatic mission. Muhammad asked both of them: Do you bear witness that I am the Messenger of God? They both responded by asking: Do you bear witness that Musaylimah is the Messenger of God? Hearing that, Muhammad replied: If it were permitted to execute the delegates of a political mission, I would execute you both. After relating this event, Abdullah said: For this reason I punished Ibn al-Nawahah by death.[16]

It is clear that this event occurred during the time of Umar when Abdullah ibn Masud was chief judge of Kufah under him.

5. Some men who were spreading the claim of Musaylimah were captured in Kufah. Uthman was informed in writing about it. He wrote in response that the true religion (din-i haqq) and the confession: "There is no god except God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God", should be presented before them. Whoever accepts it and reveals his rejection of Musaylimah should be released. Whoever upholds the religion of Musaylimah should be executed.[17]

6. A man who was formerly a Christian, then was Muslim, and again became a Christian was brought before Ali. Ali asked him: What is the cause of your conduct? He replied: I have found the religion of the Christians better than your religion. Ali asked: What is your belief about Jesus? He said: He is my Lord (Rabb); or else he said: He is Lord of Ali. Hearing this, Ali ordered that he be executed.[18]

7. Ali was informed about a group of Christians who had become Muslims and then became Christians again. Ali arrested them, summoned them before himself and enquired about the truth of the matter. They said: We were Christians. Then we were offered the choice of remaining Christians or becoming Muslims. We chose Islam. But now it is our opinion that no religion is more excellent than our first religion. Therefore we have become Christians now. Hearing this, Ali ordered these people to be executed and their children enslaved.[19]

8. Ali was informed that some people regarded him as their Lord (Rabb). He called them and asked: What do you say? They said: You are our Lord, our Creator and Sustainer. Ali said: You are in a sad situation. I am a servant like you. Like you I eat and drink. If I obey God, He rewards me. If I disobey Him, I fear He will punish me. Therefore fear God and abandon your confession. But they refused. The next day Qanbar came and reported the people were saying the same thing. He called them, and on enquiring about the matter, they repeated the same things. The third day Ali called and threatened them: If you say the same thing, I will kill you in a most terrible manner. Still they remained adamant in their opinion. Finally Ali had a pit prepared and a fire burning in it. Then he said: Look, stop this confession immediately. Otherwise I will throw you into this pit. But they persisted in their affirmation. Then at Ali's command all of them were thrown into the pit.[20]

9. When Ali was in Rahbah, someone informed him that the occupants of a particular house kept an idol in it and worshipped it. Hearing this, Ali himself went there. The idol was discovered after searching. Ali set the house on fire and it was burnt along with its occupants.[21]

10. A man who had been a Muslim but became a kafir was arrested. This happened during the time of Ali and he was brought to Ali. Ali gave him a one month period to repent and then enquired of him. But he refused to repent. Finally Ali had him put to death.[22]

These ten examples cover the whole period of the Rightly-Guided Caliphate and demonstrate that whenever apostasy occurred during the time of these four caliphs, the punishment meted out for it was death alone. In any of the events that these examples portray, the inclusion of another crime, apart from the apostasy itself, cannot be demonstrated whereby it could have been said that, in fact, the punishment of death had been given for another crime, not for apostasy.

D. The First Caliph's Jihad (Holy War) against Apostates

But more weighty than all of these examples is the example of the jihad of Abu Bakr Siddiq against "the people of apostasy". The whole company of the Companions of the Prophet participated in it. Even if in the beginning anyone disagreed with this war, later the disagreement changed to agreement. This event therefore clearly proves that those persons who received religious instruction directly from the Prophet were united in deciding that an Islamic government should wage war against any group that renounces Islam. Some people argue that this event was a jihad because they understand the apostates to have been in fact rebels who had ceased paying the government tax (zakat), dismissed the government officials and began to establish their own governments. But this argument is definitely wrong on four accounts:

1. Not all the people against whom the jihad was conducted withheld zakat. In fact they included various types of apostates. Some Arabs believed in individuals who had laid claim to prophethood and proclaimed their message in various corners of Arabia. Others renounced their faith in the prophethood of Muhammad, saying that if Muhammad had been a prophet, he would not have died (law kana Muhammadun nabiyyan ma mata). Some people acknowledged all the requirements of religion and were ready to pay even zakat. But, they added, they themselves would collect and spend their zakat and would not give it to the officials of Abu Bakr. Still others said: We followed God's Messenger when he was among us, but how amazing that Abu Bakr's rule is imposed upon us!

It was as if they opposed the establishment of the caliphate after the prophet and the arrangement that all Muslims by compulsion were attached to this focal point as they had been attached to the personality of the Messenger of God.

2. For all these various kinds of people the Companions of the Prophet used the word "apostate" (murtadd) instead of "rebel" and the word "apostasy" (irtidad) instead of "rebellion" when referring to that disturbance. From this it is clearly evident that in their view the real crime that the people had committed was apostasy and not rebellion. At the time when Abu Bakr sent Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl to wage a jihad against the people in South Arabia who had confessed the prophethood of Laqit ibn Malik al-Azdi, he advised him: Wherever you find apostates from Oman to Hadramaut and Yemen, crush them.

3. When doubt was expressed regarding the permissibility or otherwise of waging a war against those who refused to pay zakat, Abu Bakr replied: By God! I will wage war against anyone who differentiates between namaz (ritual prayer) and zakat (almsgiving). This clearly means that in the view of the first caliph their real crime was not the withholding of zakat but the acceptance of one pillar (of Islam) and the rejection of another.[23]

Finally the companions agreed with the caliph to wage jihad against those refusing to pay zakat only because they were completely satisfied with the incumbent caliph's arguments that the opponents had renounced the true religion by drawing a (false) distinction between namaz and zakat.

4. More decisive than all of the above is Abu Bakr's proclamation which he had issued in writing to each of the commanders of the eleven armies at the time he sent the armies to the various parts of Arabia to wage jihad against the apostates. Hafiz ibn Kathir has copied the full proclamation in his book al-Badayah w'al-Nahayah (Vol. 6, p. 316). The following sentences especially merit consideration:

E. Agreement of the Leading Mujtahids (Jurists)

To copy the consecutive writings of all the lawyers from the first to the fourteenth century A.H. would make our discussion very long. Yet we cannot avoid mentioning that however much the four Schools of Law may differ among themselves regarding the various aspects of this problem, in any case all four Schools without doubt agree on the point that the punishment of the apostate is execution.

According to the School of Malik, as written in his book Muwatta:

According to the Hanbali School as explained in the well authenticated book al-Mughni:

Imam Tahawi has provided an interpretation of the Hanafi School in his book Sharh Ma'ani al-Athar as follows:

An extended explanation of the Hanafi school is found in the Hidayah and reads:

Unfortunately at this time I have no reliable book dealing with Shafi'i jurisprudence; yet the representation of this school as found in the Hidayah is as follows:

Probably these many witnesses will dispel all doubt about the penalty for the apostate according to Islamic law. The penalty is execution, and the penalty is because of apostasy itself and not because of any other crime that may have been connected with the apostasy.[32]

Some people, after hearing these discourses from the Hadith and the Law, keep on asking: Where is the punishment written in the Qur'an? Even though we have demonstrated the presence of this order also in the Qur'an in the beginning of our discussion, yet, for the satisfaction of these people, let us suppose the commandment is not found in the Qur'an. Still the large number of Hadith, the decisions of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and the united opinions of the lawyers suffice fully to establish this commandment.

We ask those who deem this evidence insufficient and request some Quranic reference to prove the existence of this commandment: In your opinion is the full Islamic penal code the same as that which is found in the Qur'an? If your answer is in the affirmative, it is as if you are saying that apart from those actions which the Qur'an designates as criminal and for which a penalty is prescribed, no other action will be punishable as a crime. Then consider this matter again. Can you run any government in the world successfully even for one day on this principle? If you answer in the negative and you yourself also admit that an Islamic order of government must reckon with other crimes also besides those crimes and their punishment mentioned in the Qur'an and the need for a detailed penal code relative to them, then we ask a second question. Which law will be more worthy to be called Muslim: The law which was in use during the rule of the Prophet and the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs and which was accepted with full agreement and without break for thirteen hundred years by the whole Muslim community's judges, magistrates and legal scholars or the law formulated at present by some persons who have been influenced and overcome by non-Islamic studies and non-Islamic culture and civilization and who have not obtained even a partial education in Islamic disciplines?

1. All Quranic quotations come from M. M. Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, The New American Library, New York, n.d., unless otherwise noted.

Mawdudi's variations within these verses in brackets: "But if they repent (from kufr)..."; "And if they break their pledges after their treaty (i.e., treaty of accepting Islam)...." Arberry translates ahad more appropriately as "covenant" rather than "treaty". (The Koran Interpreted, Oxford University Press, London, 1964)

For S. A. Rahman's rejection and reflection on Mawdudi's application and interpretation of this verse, see Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, l972, pp. 10-13.

As the following line in the text indicates, Muslims understand this verse to be revealed in A.H. 9 = After Hijrah. Muhammad's emigration (hijrah) from Mecca to Medina marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar.

2. After a detailed review of the Quranic evidence for the execution of the apostate, Rahman concluded "that not only is there no punishment for apostasy provided in the Book but that the Word of God clearly envisages the natural death of the apostate. He will be punished only in the Hereafter...." (ibid. p. 54)

Mohamed S. El-Awa is of the same opinion, noting also that he agrees with Heffening's statement (under murtadd in the Encyclopaedia of Islam): "In the Qur'an the apostate is threatened with punishment in the next world only." (Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative Study, American Trust Publications, Indianapolis, 1982, pp. 50, 51)

Majid Khadduri (War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1955) cites Qur'an 2:217 (latter portion); 4:88, 89; 5:54; 16:106, noting also that while "only the second of these four verses specifically states that death sentence should be imposed on those who apostatize or turn back from their religion, all the commentators agree that a believer who turns back from his religion (irtadda), openly or secretly, must be killed if he persists in disbelief" (p. 150). For his whole discussion on kafir and murtadd see pp. 149-152. Cf. S. M. Zwemer, The Law of Apostasy in Islam, Marshall Brothers, Ltd., London, 1924, pp. 33-35.

3. We have translated this and the following traditions from Mawdudi's Urdu translations of the original Arabic texts. Cf. al-Bukhari, The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari, tr. Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, vol. 9, p. 45. The translator translates din as "Islamic religion".

This and the following citations of Arabic source materials are Mawdudi's.

4. Bukhari, Kitab al-Diyat; Muslim, Kitab al-Qasamah w'al-Maharabin w'al-Qisas w'al-Diyat; Abu Dawud, Kitab al-Hudud, Bab al-Hukm fi Man Artadda.

5. Nasa'i, Sunan, Bab Dhikr Ma Yuhillu Bihi Dam al-Muslim.

6. ibid.

7. Nasa'i, Sunan Bab al-Hukm fi'l Murtadd.

8. ibid.; Bukhari, Sahih, Bab Hukm al-Murtadd w'al Murtaddah wa Istitabathum; Abu Dawud, Kitab al-Hudud Bab al-Hukm fi Man Artadda; cf. al-Bukhari, tr. Khan, op. cit. vol. 9, pp. 45, 46.

9. Abu Dawud, op. cit.

10. ibid. For more information on how Abdullah ibn Sad fabricated Quranic passages, deceived Muhammad and later, under Uthman, became a general and governor see The Life of Muhammad, A Translation of Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah by A. Guillaume, O.U.P., London, 1955, p. 550; Encyclopaedia of Islam[2] (under Abdullah ibn Sa'd); T. P. Hughes, Dictionary of Islam (under Abdullah ibn Sa'd); I. Goldziher, Die Richtungen der Islamischen Koranauslegung, Brill, Leiden, 1920, p. 35. Has any Muslim writer provided a serious analysis of the dynamics involved in this event as alluded to in this tradition and its commentary?

11. Bayhaqi.

12. Daraqutni and Bayhaqi.

13. ibid.

14. Kanz al-'Ummal.

15. Tahawi, Kitab al-Siyar, Bahth Istitabat al-Murtadd; also Bayhaqi, Muwatta; al-Shafi'i, Kitab al-Umm.

16. Tahawi, op. cit. Mawdudi adds the following note: "To understand this matter one must know that the tribe of Banu Hanifah, along with Ibn al-Nawahah and Hajar bin Wathal, had previously become Muslims. When Musaylimah laid claim to prophethood, they acknowledged it. Thus, when the Prophet said to Abdullah ibn al-Nawahah and Hajar ibn Wathal: 'If it were permitted to execute the delegates of a diplomatic mission, I would execute you both', it clearly means that because of your apostasy you ought to die. But since you have come this time as an ambassador, the rule of the shari'ah cannot be applied against you. For more information on the Wars of Secession (Riddah), Musaylimah and others, see any edition of The Encyclopaedia of Islam.

17. Tahawi, op. cit.

18. ibid.

19. ibid.

20. ibid., p. 239.

21. Fath al-Bari, vol. 12, p. 239.

22. Kanz al-'Ummal, vol. 1, p. 8.

23. The five duties of Islam: 1. confession of faith; 2. ritual prayer; 3. fasting; 4. alms; 5. pilgrimage.

24. lit. "migrants (from Mecca) and helpers (from Medina) and their good followers".

25. For an early Muslim historian's report on the apostasy of the Arabs at the time of Abu Bakr, see al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh al-Buldan (The Origins of the Islamic State), tr. P. K. Hitti, Khayat, Beirut, 1966, esp. pp.116-162. The even earlier biography of Muhammad Ibn Ishaq refers to the apostasy of Ubaydullah ibn Jahsh, who "had migrated with the Muslims, but when he got to Abyssinia he turned Christian and died there as such having abandoned Islam ..." (The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah, op. cit., p. 527). Nothing indicates he was punished for apostasy. Do this and other early events during the life of Muhammad suggest the possibility of a development in the legal response to apostasy from Islam, perhaps even the matter of consistency regarding the response? Cf. ibid., especially p. 504 regarding the truce of Hudaybiyya which seems to allow for the possibility of followers of Muhammad returning to the enemy. For a useful account of jihad in general and jihad against apostates in particular see Khadduri, op. cit., esp. pp. 76, 77. Among Muslims today, especially in the West, the nature of jihad is perhaps an even more contentious issue than apostasy.

26. Mawdudi's footnote: "Zindiq means 'atheist'"

27. Bab al-Qada' fi Man Artadda 'an al-Islam; cf. Imam Malik, Muwatta, trans. by Muhammad Rahim-ud-din, Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, p. 317.

28. Vol. 10. p. 74.

29. Kitab al-Siyar Bahth Istitabat al-Murtadd.

30. Bab Ahkam al-Murtaddin. The Urdu text has been translated. A later reprinting of the English translation of the Hidayah: The Hedaya, tr. Charles Hamilton Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, 1985, which appears to be a photocopy of the original edition in 1791. The section "Of the Laws concerning Apostates" contains 22 pages. A portion of it appears in this work as part of Appendix B and includes Hamilton's versions of the above and following quotations.

Another reprint of the English translation (The Hedaya, Charles Hamilton, Premier Book House, Lahore, 1975) claims to be an exact reproduction of the second edition (1870), adding: "It is hoped that the publication of this treasure of Islamic Jurisprudence which remained out of print for more than half a century will be greatly appreciated." The whole of Book IX, containing also ch. 9 on Apostates, is only outlined and concludes with the note: "This subject is omitted, as it is inapplicable to India" (pp. 205, 206). Would converts from Islam in India agree to its inapplicability?

31. Again, our translation. See Note 30.

32. For Mawdudi, it seems, apostasy "pure and simple", quite apart from any consideration of the apostate's rebellion against or threat to the state, merits execution. Or, he would insist, the apostate is a rebel against the state; his apostasy is his act of treason against the state. Mawdudi's apparent rejection of any distinction between the two is what appears especially to frustrate S. A. Rahman and other like-minded Muslims, who would insist that the execution of the apostate for "pure and simple" apostasy from Islam mocks Islam's claim to proclaim religious freedom.

Thus far we have discussed whether or not in Islam the punishment of an apostate is execution. We now move to the next question, which the enquirer has posed in these words:

To a great extent the law of the execution of the apostate itself has decided the matter in that when within the boundaries of our authority we do not grant any person who is a Muslim the right to leave Islam to accept another religion (madhhab) or way (maslak), then we must infer from this only that within the confines of the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam) we also do not tolerate the proclamation and spread of any other religion in opposition to Islam. To grant other religions and ways the right to propagate and then to declare a Muslim's change to another religion a crime are affirmations which contradict each other. The second law automatically negates the first law. Therefore, the law of the execution of the apostate, by its very nature, suffices to lead us to conclude that Islam does not tolerate the propagation of kufr within the boundaries of its authority. It might be said, however, that the law protects only Muslims from the effects of the propagation of kufr. Then the question would still remain whether or not Islam allows within its boundaries non-Muslims and preachers from abroad to spread the message of their respective religions and ways among the non-Muslim population.

A. Investigating the Problem

For an investigation of this question it is necessary to properly understand the true position of Islam and the nature of Islamic rule. As it truly is, Islam itself offers mankind a way and categorically claims that this way is the true way and all other ways are false. The welfare of humanity rests upon this way alone. All other ways lead humanity to nothing but destruction. Hence all people should walk along this way and forsake other ways.

According to Islam every path of thought and action which any non-Muslim promotes is crooked. The person following it ends up incurring loss and nothing but pure loss.

Islam's claim and message create no inner conflict within Islam. For Islam the doubt that another way also may be true and a source of salvation for mankind does not arise. Islam is fully confident that it is the authentic way and all other ways are false. It asserts firmly, seriously and sincerely that all other ways lead mankind to hell and understands its own way alone to be the one way of salvation for mankind.

Now when this is the real position of Islam, obviously our preference about it is irrelevant. Moreover it is extremely difficult even to tolerate the spreading of those messages among the children of Adam which lead them to eternal destruction. It cannot give an open licence to the proclaimers of falsehood to drag other people to the same pit of fire toward which they themselves are going. At most it can tolerate, and that with heavy heart, only that the person who wishes to remain firm in kufr has the choice to abandon the way of his own welfare and walk on the way of his own destruction. And this too it tolerates only because the law of nature renders it impossible to instil faith into someone forcibly. If, on the other hand, it were possible forcibly to save people from the poison of kufr, then concern for human welfare would necessitate restraining the hand of everyone in the process of drinking the cup's poison. Islam's avoidance of compulsory protection and salvation does not rest on its understanding of the right of people to move toward the pit of destruction and to deem it wrong to stop and to save them; rather the reason for avoidance of this good action rests on the sole fact that in accordance with the law by which God created the present arrangement of the universe, no person can be saved from the destructive results of kufr unless he himself acknowledges and confesses the error of his blasphemous manner of thought and action and is ready to choose the Muslim way of life. For this reason, and for this reason only, Islam gives the servants of God the option of taking the path of destruction, if that is what they wish. From this, however, it is absurd to expect that it will give these "suicidal persons" the further option of inducing other servants of God to proceed along the same path of destruction on which they themselves are going. Where it has no authority, there it is helpless. But if, where its rule is established and it has taken responsibility for the welfare and prosperity of God's servants, it is impossible to give licence to the preachment of theft, prostitution, opium and poison, then how can it be possible there to give licence to preach the much more dangerous kufr, shirk (idolatry), atheism and rebellion against God?

B. The Fundamental Objective of Islamic Rule

Islam establishes its rule not only with the purpose of organizing a nation but with a clear and fixed objective which it explains in these words:

According to these verses the true purpose of the Messenger's mission is to ensure the victory of the guidance and Religion of Truth, which he has brought from God over every other competing order of life of a religious nature. From this it necessarily follows that where the Messenger achieves success in his mission, there he cannot let any movement arise which competes with God's guidance and His religion and strives for the ascendancy of another religion or order of life.

As the successors of the Messenger after the Messenger's departure are heirs of the religion which he had brought from God, in the same way they are heirs of the mission for which God had ordained him. The very purpose of all their struggles, it is agreed, is to make all religion the sole preserve of God.

Hence, wherever they control the affairs of this life and must be fully answerable to God for the administration of a particular country or territory, in no way during their tenure of supervision can they there legally provide an opportunity to any other religion to spread its message as competition to the religion of God, because the provision of such an opportunity will certainly mean that all religion will not be for God and whatever evil of any false order of life remains will further grow. In the end, to what will they testify before God? Will they testify: Where You have granted us the power to rule, there we have provided evil an opportunity to raise its head against Your religion?

C. The Position of Dhimmis and Protected Ones in the House of Islam

Under Islamic rule the freedom given to non-Muslims to remain in their religion and, in compensation for jizyah, the responsibility undertaken for the protection of their life, property and religious practice have at most only the following consequence: They may continue to walk on the path they want. If, by going beyond this, they try to make their way prevail, then no Islamic government worthy of its name can ever give them this permission. The clear words of the Quranic verse explaining the law of jizyah read:

According to this verse the true position of Dhimmis under Islamic rule is to be content to remain low (saghirun). As Dhimmis they cannot try to become great (kabirun). Similarly non-Muslims from abroad who come seeking protection may enter into the House of Islam. They can certainly come for commerce, arts and crafts, politics, education and all other cultural purposes. But they can never come with the purpose of exalting the message of their religion at the expense of God's Word. The sole purpose of the help which Allah gave His messenger and, following him, the Muslims against the kuffar or in the future will give them, and as a result of which the House of Islam was previously established or will be established in the future at some point, was and will be in the future also to make low the word of kufr and to lift high the Word of God.

Thus Muslims will be terribly "unmindful of good" and "ungrateful for blessing" if, after benefiting from this help from God, they allow those who disbelieved to attempt to raise their "nethermost" word to become "uppermost" within their area of control.

D. The Course of Action During the Period of the Prophet and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs

The strict policy carried out during the rule of the Prophet and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs has been described above. In Arabia Musaylimah, Aswad Ansi, Tulhah Asadi, Sajah, Laqit ibn Malik Azdi and whoever else proclaimed a message contrary to Islam were forcibly suppressed. Non-Muslim nations covenanted with the Muslims by paying jizyah and accepted living under Muslim rule as Dhimmis. Many of these covenants, word for word, are found in the Hadith and history books. But while these books detail all rights and privileges, nowhere is there mention of any right which would allow them to proclaim their religion within the boundaries of the House of Islam. Moreover the details of the Dhimmis' rights, which Muslims themselves graciously bestowed on non-Muslims, are found in the books on jurisprudence (fiqh). But these books too are devoid of any reference to this so-called "right". How Islamic rule should treat non-Muslims coming from outside as protected ones is fully explained by the lawyers. Here too we have not even the slightest hint to suggest that Islamic rule should give any such person, who may wish it, permission to promote his own religion within its boundaries. If later "world-worshipping" caliphs and kings ever acted against this principle, this does not prove that Islamic law allows it; rather it demonstrates, in fact, that these people have become unfamiliar with the duties of a truly Islamic government or have deviated from them. The people who have considered the present concept of tolerance as the standard of truth can present with great pride the achievements of kings for appreciation before non-Muslims, such as those Muslim kings who donated so many properties for non-Muslim places of worship and schools and other kings during whose period full freedom was provided the people of all groups to proclaim their respective religions. But from an Islamic point of view all these achievements warrant inscription on the list of the crimes of those kings.

Note

1. The whole verse reads: "Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, and forbid not that which Allah hath forbidden by His messenger, and follow not the religion of truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low." See Appendix A for Mawdudi's fuller explanation of Dhimmi.

We must now discuss the second aspect of our question, i.e., if in Islam the punishment of the apostate is really execution and if, truly, Islam does not tolerate the rise and spread of any rival religion within its borders, then what are our arguments that lead us to understand its attitude to be correct and reasonable? First we shall speak about the problem of the execution of the apostate. Then we will deal with the question of prohibiting the preachment of kufr.

A. The Arguments of the Critics

The most likely objections against the execution of the apostate are these:

1. This idea is against the freedom of conscience. Every person should have the freedom to accept whatever satisfies his heart and to reject whatever does not satisfy him. As every person initially must be able to accept or reject the way before him, similarly he should also have the option later to remain on or abandon the way of his original choice. The person who is ready to abandon the way he has chosen to follow is ready to do it because he no longer believes in the truth of that way. Then how can it be right to offer him the gallows when he has determined to leave that way because he no longer believes it? Does this mean that if you cannot change a person's belief by arguments, then you should force him to change his belief by threatening him with death? And if he does not change, then do you punish him because he did not change his belief?

2. In any case the faith which is thus forcibly changed or the faith which people maintain because of the fear of death cannot be a genuine faith. This faith will be manifestly hypocritical, chosen to deceive in order to save one's life. Finally how can a religion provide security by such deception and hypocrisy? Following a religion or a way, whatever it may be, is meaningless, unless the follower can believe it with a true heart. And it is clear that belief within oneself cannot be created by force or sustained by force. A man's neck can surely be bent by sheer force but sheer force cannot create faith and confidence in anyone's mind and heart. Hence, of what use is it if a person, a kafir by conviction, hypocritically keeps living as a Muslim externally in order to be saved from the punishment of death? Neither will he be a true follower of Islam; nor in the presence of God can this external display of Islam be the means of his salvation; nor can the continued membership of such a person within the Muslim community serve as a wholesome community gain.

3. If the principle is accepted that a religion has the right to compel all the people who have entered into its sphere of influence to continue to follow it and views it lawful to punish by death those who leave its circle, then the proclamation and promotion of all religions will cease. This would prove a serious obstacle also for Islam itself. All people virtually are followers of one religion or another. If, then, every religion approves the punishment of execution for apostasy, it will be difficult not only for Muslims to embrace another religion but also for non-Muslims to embrace Islam.

4. Islam has adopted a totally contradictory stance in this matter. On the one hand it says: "There is no compulsion in religion" (la ikraha fi'd din: Qur'an 2:256) and "Whosoever will, let him believe and whosoever will, let him disbelieve" (fa man sha'a falyu'min wa man sha'a falyakfur: Qur'an 18:30). On the other hand it itself threatens to punish by death the person who renounces Islam and determines to move toward kufr. On the one hand it severely criticizes hypocrisy and wants to see its followers as righteous believers. On the other hand it itself, through death threats, compels Muslims who have lost faith in Islam to engage in a hypocritical show of faith. On the one hand it severely reprimands those non-Muslims who hinder their co-religionists from accepting Islam. On the other hand it itself directs Muslims to execute any of their co-religionists who want to go over to another religion.

Externally these objections appear so strong that one Muslim group, conceding defeat before them, had to resort to the old policy of a subdued people, i.e., when your opponents gain the upper hand in a dispute over a problem in your religion, then tear it out of the rule book and clearly state that the matter under dispute has nothing whatever to do with your religion. A second Muslim group, finding it impossible to reject the truth like the first group, acknowledged the reality of the issue. Nevertheless its inability to formulate a rational response to these intellectual criticisms left even the staunchest Muslims convinced that, while doubtless the order to execute the apostate is found in Islam, supporting it rationally is difficult. I remember well about 18 years ago when on one occasion a terrible agitation arose in India over the problem of executing an apostate.[1] It called forth a downpour of objections from everywhere. At this time even so true a Muslim as the now deceased Mawlana Muhammad Ali capitulated to these arguments. Numerous distinguished persons among the religious leaders ('ulama') on this occasion represented the true legal aspects of the problem very competently. But the arguments they presented to refute the intellectual objections were feeble enough to make one wonder whether they themselves perhaps felt in their hearts that the matter lacked rational support. The effects of that weak defence remain until now.

B. A Fundamental Misconception

The truth of the matter is this: If Islam is truly a "religion" in the sense that religion is understood at present, surely it would be absurd to prescribe the penalty of execution for those people who wish to leave it because of their dissatisfaction with its principles. Currently religion is considered to be a belief or thought which a person selects with reference to metaphysical concerns. To obtain salvation in the life after death there is a way on which a man acts according to his belief. But what about the organizing of society, the negotiating of the concerns of this world and the shape of government? All this has to do with this world only and has no connection with religion. According to this concept the nature of religion is merely that of belief, even that kind of belief which is concerned with a totally remote phase of life whose existence and change has no noticeable effect on the great and significant ramifications of human life. In the matter of such faith a person must indeed be free. It makes no sense that he should be free to choose a particular belief regarding metaphysical matters but not be free to change it when he begins to feel his previous belief to be wrong on the basis of other proofs which confront him. Similarly, there is no reason why he should be able to choose to follow a way on which he fixes his hope for salvation in the other world and not have the right to choose a new way as his hope of salvation and abandon the previous way. Thus, if the nature of Islam is simply the nature of religion as it is understood these days, nothing could be more absurd than that Islam keep its door open for those entering but station an executioner at the door for those departing.

In fact, this has not at all been the nature of Islam. It is not only a "religion" in the modern technical sense of that term but a complete order of life. It relates not only to the metaphysical but also to nature and everything in nature. It discourses not only on the salvation of life after death but also on the questions of prosperity, improvement and the true ordering of life before death. It establishes a dependence of salvation after death upon the true ordering of life before death. Granted that it is nevertheless only a belief. Yet it is not a belief which is concerned only with some remote phase of life. Rather, it is that belief on whose foundation a plan for the whole of life rests. It is not a belief whose existence or change has no noticeable effect on the great and significant ramifications of human life but a belief on whose continuation the continuation of civilization and the state depend and the changing of which means changing the order of civilization and state. It is not a faith which a person may choose with only the concern of the individual in mind. It is that faith on the basis of which a society of people establishes a complete order of a civilization in a particular form and brings into existence a state to operate it. A faith and idea of this nature cannot be made into a game for the liberties of individuals. Nor can the society, which establishes the order of civilization and state on that faith, make way for any brainwave to enter, then to be displaced by another brainwave, to come and go at will. This is not a game or picnic intended to entertain a person in a totally irresponsible manner. This is a terribly serious and extremely delicate work whose fine balance affects the order of society and state. Its success and failure affect the success and failure of thousands and millions of God's servants. Its outcome is a matter of life and death for a very large company of people. When in this world was such a faith and membership in a society holding this faith made the toy of individual free wills? Does anyone suggest that this is Islam's expectation?

C. The Natural Requirement of an Organized Society

An organized society which has chosen the form of a state can hardly provide a place within its sphere of activity for people who differ from it in fundamental matters. Differences of lesser significance can more or less be tolerated. But it is very difficult to give people a place in society and make them a part of the state if they completely oppose the foundations on which the order of society and the state are established. In this matter Islam has practised a degree of tolerance which no other order in the history of the world has ever practised. All other orders either force those who differ on fundamentals to conform to their principles or they destroy them. Islam alone, while making them tributaries and providing them with the greatest possible freedom of action, gives them place within its borders and tolerates many of their activities that directly conflict with the foundation of the Islamic state and society. The sole cause of this toleration is because Islam does not despair of human nature. It operates with an enduring hope in the servants of God, trusting that when those who at present do not see the light of the true religion will have an opportunity to live under it and experience its gifts and blessings, they will finally accept this truth. Therefore it works patiently and continues to tolerate those obdurate elements which do not assimilate into society and the state, hoping that at some point they will experience transformation and accept assimilation. But the sole treatment for the person whose hard heart, once transformed, has again hardened and who demonstrates no capacity whatever to assimilate into society's order is to cast him out. In any case, the value of the individual, however great it be, cannot be great enough to allow the whole order of society to be corrupted because of it.

D. Response to Criticisms

The person who says "the execution of the apostate" means simply a punishment for changing a faith after choosing it in fact himself already interprets one matter wrongly and then himself imposes a false commandment upon it. As indicated above the true position of an apostate is that he by his apostasy provides proof that he not only rejects the foundation for the order of society and state but offers no hope that he will ever accept it in the future. When such a person finds this foundation on which society and the state are constructed to be unacceptable to himself, it will be appropriate for him to move outside its borders. But when he fails to do this, only two ways of dealing with him are possible. Either he should be stripped of all his rights of citizenship and allowed to remain alive or else his life should be terminated. In fact the first form of punishment is worse than the second since in this terrible state "he will neither die nor live" (Qur'an 20:74). Moreover, alive, he becomes a greater danger for society, since his existence will be a permanent plague spreading among the people and a source of fear lest also the other whole and healthy members of society be permeated with his poison. It is therefore better to punish him by death and thereby at one and the same time to put an end to his own and society's misery.

It is also wrong to interpret "the execution of the apostate" as our forcing a person, by threatening him with death, to adopt a hypocritical behaviour. In fact the matter is the opposite. We want to block entrance into our society of those people who are afflicted with the disease of capriciousness and keep on playing musical chairs with theories and ideas for their own amusement, and who lack totally the stability of belief and character which the building of an order of life requires. Constructing an order of life is a highly serious task. In the society which takes on this task, there can be no place for fickle and unstable people. Only those people should compose it who seriously accept the order and, having accepted it, apply heart and soul to its construction and maintenance. It is therefore a matter of true wisdom and discretion that everyone who wishes to join this community should first be informed that the punishment for reverting is death, so that he may think a hundred times whether or not he ought to join this community before he joins. Then only he will join the community who will never leave it.

The basis for the criticism which we have noted under part 3 is also wrong. What the critics have in mind is, in fact, the matter of the "religions" and their propagation, which we have explained in the beginning. Truly such religions should keep their doors open for those who come and go. Closing them to those wishing to leave would be an inappropriate action on their part. But any reasonable person who has even some understanding of a co-operative society cannot advise the religion on whose ideas and actions society and state are constructed to keep open its door that would spell its own ruin, the scattering of its own structure's parts, the stripping away of the bonds of its own existence. Building and destroying an ordered society and state have always been a life-risking task. By its very nature this task will always remain the same. It has never happened in the world, and it cannot be expected to happen in the future, that any order of life can be changed apart from playing with fire and blood. Only that order of life can be ready for change, without hindrance, whose roots have rotted and in whose foundation no confidence remains to justify its continued existence.

Then there is the criticism of contradiction, which for the most part will disappear automatically by carefully reading the above discussion. "There is no compulsion in religion" (la ikraha fi'd din: Qur'an 2:256) means that we do not compel anyone to come into our religion.[2] And this is truly our practice. But we initially warn whoever would come and go back that this door is not open to come and go. Therefore anyone who comes should decide before coming that there is no going back. Otherwise he should kindly not come. Let someone explain what contradiction is finally to be found here. Without doubt, we deplore hypocrisy and want to see everyone in our community as a true believer. But if hypocrisy overtakes anyone who steps away from his community through the door he knows is no exit, the fault lies with himself. To extricate him from this condition, we cannot expose our order to anarchy. If he has such concern for righteousness that he does not want to remain a hypocrite but wants to be true to the object of his present belief, then why would he himself not come forward to receive the punishment of execution?

True, the criticism that Islam does not consider it objectionable to punish its followers who renounce it but objects that other religions may punish their followers for leaving their religions to embrace Islam holds some weight superficially. But the contradiction which superficially appears from these two attitudes in reality does not exist. Moreover, if in both cases a single attitude were adopted, then assuredly there would be a contradiction. Islam calls itself the truth and considers itself to be the truth in all sincerity. For this reason it can never recognize those moving toward the truth and those moving away from the truth to be on an equal level. It is right for anyone coming to the truth to come and whoever blocks his path deserves to be reprimanded. It is not right for anyone reverting from the truth to revert and whoever blocks his path does not deserve to be reprimanded. There is no contradiction in this attitude. Surely, if Islam calls itself the truth and then recognizes those moving toward it and those moving away from it to be on the same level, no doubt it would be acting in a contradictory manner.

E. The Basic Difference between a Mere Religion and a Religious State

Above we have noted the arguments of those who object to the execution of the apostate and the arguments we have presented in response to them. When comparing them, one thing clearly emerges and it is this: Whatever objections the critics pose regarding the punishment of the apostate, they make them bearing in mind only a single "religion" (madhhab). In contrast, when we present our arguments to demonstrate the validity of this punishment, we have in view no mere "religion" but a state which is constructed on a religion (din) and the authority of its principles rather than on the authority of a family, clan or people.

As far as a mere religion is concerned, our critics and we agree that such a religion has no right to punish the apostate when the order and arrangement of society and the existence of the state are not, for all practical purposes, established on its foundation. Wherever and in whatever circumstances Islam actually assumes that character of a religion which the critics understand religion to have, there we ourselves also reject punishing the apostate by execution. Islamic jurisprudence is not confined to the punishment of apostasy. None of Islam's penal laws can be applied when the Islamic state (or, in terms of the shariah, the "sultan") is not existing. Thus the discussion on this aspect of the problem between our critics and ourselves automatically ends.

Now only the second aspect of this matter remains to be discussed, i.e., where religion itself is the ruler, where religious law is state law, where religion has taken into its own hands the responsibility of maintaining peace and order, does or does not religion have the right to punish those who have promised loyalty and obedience to it and then turn away. We answer this question in the affirmative. Do our critics answer in the negative? If they do not, then the conflict completely disappears. If they do, then we want to know their objection and the evidence for it.

F. The Legal Right of the Government

This separate discussion asks whether or not a religious state is intrinsically good. Since generations of Westerners have borne the burden of the painful history of the Papacy and have been so hurt by it, they even tremble with fear when they hear the term "state religion". Hence, whenever they chance to converse on a topic which sounds suspiciously related to "state religion" (however completely unrelated it be with the Papacy), then the emotional excitement of these poor souls incapacitates them from carrying on a rational conversation on the topic in a dispassionate manner. As for their Eastern disciples, they have borrowed from the West whatever treasure of knowledge they have on social and temporal problems. Moreover, they not only inherit their knowledge from their teachers, but along with this inherited knowledge they also acquire their emotions, proclivities and prejudices. Therefore, when discussion arises over the execution of the apostates and other problems of a like nature, then normally both Westerners and their Eastern disciples lose their balance and begin to confuse the true legal and constitutional question in their discussions which are related to the discussion whether or not a state religion is inherently valid. Yet, if, suppose, an Islamic state would mean "religious state" (madhhabi riyasat) in the sense that Westerners understand it, then here too this discussion is entirely unrelated to the problem. The sole question is whether or not a state having jurisdiction over a portion of the earth has the right to protect its own existence by declaring those acts wrong which undermine its order. If anyone objects to this, then let him tell us when a world state did not exercise this right. And which state today does not exercise this right? Forget the communist and fascist states. Look only at those democratic states whose history and ideas have been a lesson in democracy for the modern world and who today have the honour of holding high the banner of democratic order. Do they not exercise this right?

G. The Example of England

Let us take England as an example. The people with whom English law is concerned are divided into two large groups: British subjects and aliens. The designation "British subject" belongs, firstly, to those who are born, within or outside of Britain, of a lineage of fathers who owe their allegiance and obedience to the king of England. They are called natural born British subjects and are considered by themselves as owing allegiance and obedience without voluntarily taking an oath of allegiance to the king of England. The term applies, secondly, to those who previously were aliens and then, after fulfilling some legal conditions, took an oath of allegiance to the king of England and received a certificate of British citizenship. Then the term "aliens" refers to all those who are of another nationality and who owe allegiance to another state but dwell within the borders of British rule. The following principles of British law concerning these various types of people are worthy of attention:

1. Every alien who has fulfilled the required legal conditions for becoming a British subject has the choice of renouncing his previous nationality and applying to become a British national. In this case the Secretary of State, after investigating his situation, will take from him the oath of allegiance and obedience to the king of England and grant him a certificate of British citizenship.

2. Any person, whether he is a British subject by birth or has become a British subject by personal choice, does not legally have the right, while living within the borders of British rule, to opt for another nationality and to take an oath of allegiance to another state or to return to the nation to which he formerly belonged. He can acquire this right only when he resides outside of British borders.

3. Even when an individual British citizen (whether a citizen by birth or by naturalization) resides outside of British borders, he does not have the right in times of war to renounce British nationality and to opt for either becoming a citizen of a nation or giving allegiance to a state which is at war with the king of England. Such an act according to British law is high treason and punishable by death.

4. Likewise any British citizen who, while residing within or outside British borders, has contact with the enemies of the king and provides them with help and convenience, or does anything to strengthen the king's enemies and weakens the defense and offense of the nation and king, commits high treason and his punishment also is death.

5. To be intent upon the death of the king, the queen or the heir to the throne or to plan it, to dishonour the king's consort, his oldest daughter or the consort of the heir to the throne, to point a weapon at the king or to aim it or to bring a weapon in his presence with the purpose of harming or intimidating him, to use force to change the religion of the state or to abrogate the laws of the state: All these too are acts of high treason and their perpetrator likewise deserves the penalty of death.

6. To strip or deprive the king of his position, his honours or his titles is also a crime, whose penalty can be life imprisonment.

In all these cases "king" means the person who is de facto king, whether or not he is de jure king. From this it is clearly evident that these laws are based not on some emotional foundation but on the principle that an established state, on whose establishment the establishment of an ordered society on a portion of the earth is dependent, has the right to use force to prevent the disintegration of its composite parts and to preserve its order from harm.

So now you see that the status of those whom British law calls "aliens" is, with minor difference, the same as that of those whom Islamic law calls "Dhimmi".[3] As the term "British subject" designates both one born a subject either by birth or by choice, similarly in Islam the term "Muslim" designates two kinds of people: 1. those born of Muslim lineage; 2. those non-Muslims who have accepted Islam by their own choice. Islamic law gives the same position to God and the Apostle which British law gives to the King and the royal family in their capacity as supreme authority. Further, as British law differentiates between the rights and obligations of British subjects and aliens, similarly Islam also distinguishes between the rights and obligations of Muslims and Dhimmis. As British law does not give the right to any British subject, while he is residing in the British Empire, to choose another nationality or take an oath of allegiance to another state or revert to his previous nationality, similarly Islamic law also does not give any Muslim the right, while he is residing within the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam), to choose any other religion or revert to the religion he had renounced to embrace Islam. As, according to British law, the British subject deserves the punishment of death because, while residing outside of British borders, he chooses the nationality of an enemy of the king of England and swears allegiance to any enemy government, similarly, according to Islamic law, the Muslim also deserves the punishment of death who, while residing outside the house of Islam, chooses the religion of the infidels at war (harbi kafiron ka din). And as British law is ready to give rights, such as aliens have, to those who have chosen to give up British nationality for a nationality of a nation at peace with England, similarly Islamic law also treats apostates, who have left the House of Islam to join an infidel nation which has a treaty with a Muslim government, in the same way it treats the kafirs of that nation. For us, then, it remains an insoluble enigma how people can understand the British legal position but they cannot understand the Islamic legal position.

H. The Example of America

After Britain let us take the country of America as the second banner bearer of democracy in the world. Although its laws differ to some extent in detail from those of Britain, in principle they fully agree. They differ simply in that the position given to the king in England is given to the national government and the federal constitution of the United States. Every person is a natural born citizen of the United States who was born from the children of a citizen, whether he was born inside or outside the United States. And a citizen by choice can be any person, who, after fulfilling some legal conditions, takes an oath of allegiance to the constitution to the United States. Apart from both of these kinds of citizens the remaining people are aliens according to American law. American law distinguishes between citizens' and aliens' rights and obligations in the same way that British law distinguishes between subjects' and aliens' rights and obligations. An alien is free to become a citizen of the United States after he has fulfilled the legal conditions for citizenship. But after he becomes a citizen he does not have the freedom, while residing within the borders of the United States, to renounce this citizenship and to revert to his previous citizenship. Likewise a born citizen also does not have the right, while in the United States, to choose another nationality and to take an oath of allegiance to another state. Analogously in the United States also the laws of treason and rebellion with reference to citizens rest on the same principles on which the British laws of treason and rebellion are founded.

The above response does not stop with these two powers. Consider the law of any nation in the world and you will see the same principles operative, i.e., any state uses force to prevent the disintegration of those elements which unite it and to suppress anything tending to destroy its order.

I. The Natural Right of the State

The validity or otherwise of the existence of a state in itself is a separate discussion. In this matter a sharp difference exists between the supporters of our view of the state and those of the secular state. In our opinion constructing a state on any rule other than the rule of God is totally invalid. Therefore, when any state per se is established on an invalid foundation, we cannot accept as valid this state's use of force to protect an invalid existence and a false order. Contrary to this our opponents consider the divine state to be invalid and only the secular state to be valid. Hence, according to them, it is the intrinsic right of the secular state to use force to protect its own existence and order but intrinsically wrong for the divine state to act in the same way. Yet leaving aside this discussion, it is a universally accepted principle that the intrinsic nature of the state and government demands that it have the right to use force to protect its own existence and order. This right is an inherent right of the state. If anything can negate this right, then it would be only that state which, itself established on a false foundation, wished to take advantage of this right. Because the existence of a falsehood in itself is a crime, it becomes a graver crime if it uses force to establish and maintain it.

J. Why Distinguish between the Kafir (Infidel) and the Murtadd (Apostate)

From the discussion thus far an ordinary person may be confused enough to ask what finally the difference is between the person who was always a kafir and another person who became a kafir after apostatizing. If a law tolerates a person who has always been a kafir and grants him a haven within its borders, then why, he asks, does it not finally tolerate a person who embraced Islam and then became a kafir or a Muslim by birth who chooses kufr. What fundamentally distinguishes the kufr of the first kafir from the kufr of the second kafir so that legally the one is not a criminal but the second is a criminal, the first is made a Dhimmi whose life and goods are protected and the second loses all his rights and is "lifted into a noose"?

In response let it be said that human nature necessarily distinguishes between one who was never affiliated and another who was affiliated and then severed the affiliation. To be unaffiliated generates no bitterness, hatred and hostility. But to affiliate and then sever affiliation does generate these passions in almost one hundred percent of these cases. The unaffiliated can never become the cause of these evils in the way that the affiliated one who severs his affiliation can become. You do not establish co-operation, friendship, confidentialities, commerce, marriage and countless types of cultural and moral relationships with an unaffiliated person as you do with an affiliated person whom you associate with and trust. Therefore the unaffiliated cannot inflict damage in the way the affiliated who severs the affiliation can. For this same reason a person naturally treats the unaffiliated in a completely different manner than he treats the affiliated who severs his affiliation. In the life of an individual the result of a separation after union is limited and is therefore generally confined to displeasure. In the life of a society it causes extremely widespread damage. Hence the society's action against the individual is also harsher. Where it is the large group rather than the individual that separates, there the extent of the damage increases greatly and hence results necessarily in an outbreak of war.

Those people who are surprised that Islam adopts different attitudes towards the kafir (infidel) and the murtadd (apostate) perhaps do not know that no social order in the world treats equally those who are not included in it and those who were but no longer are included in it. Those who separate are certainly given some kind of punishment and many times are even compelled to return. In this matter especially the greater the importance the state gives to social responsibilities, the more severe its response will be. Take the army, for example. Military legislation throughout almost the whole world shares the idea that enlistment in the army is by choice, not be compulsion. However, once a person has entered the army on his own free will, he is under compulsion to remain there. If he resigns, his resignation cannot be accepted. If he leaves on his own accord, he is a criminal. If he flees from active service in war, he merits the punishment of execution. If he escapes from ordinary military service, he can receive a life sentence. Anyone offering him refuge or covering his crime is also considered a criminal. Revolutionary parties adopt this same method of action. They compel no one to join them, but whoever leaves after joining is shot.

This concern has to do with the individual versus the community. Where the concern takes the form of community versus community, there it becomes more violent. You have often heard the terms "federation" (wafaq) and "confederation" (tahaluf). States are given the choice of participating or not participating in a union of this kind. But once a state enters as a partner, constitutionally any exit is closed to it. Moreover, where constitutionally no clause of this kind exists, there even exercising the right to separate often culminates in war. In the nineteenth century two wars focused on this issue. The first took place in Switzerland when in A.D. 1847 seven Roman Catholic cantons decided to leave the confederacy. Thereupon the remaining partners in the confederacy went to war against the seceding cantons and forced them to return. The second is the well known American civil war. In A.D. 1860 seven states from the United States of America left the union and established their own confederacy (tahaluf). Thereafter another four states separated and joined this group. Moreover six states held the common opinion that in principle each state had the right to secede and that the federal government had no right to force them to return to the federation of the United States. And so in A.D. 1861 the federal government fought against these states and, after three to four years of terrible bloodshed, forced them to become members of the Union again.

Why, generally, do all social orders, especially those of a political and military nature, take harsh action against separation after union? The strongest argument in favour of this action is naturally the social order's need of stability for its own welfare, a stability in turn which completely depends upon the utmost confidence in the harmony of those elements which brought the order into existence. A collection of untrustworthy, shaky, and fissiparous elements whose continuity cannot be trusted and whose stability is unreliable can never generate any proper kind of community life. In particular the social institution which carries the burden of providing the important community services can never be willing to assume the danger that it become composed of parts which may disintegrate at any time. If a building made from fragile bricks and stones is not a satisfactory place for human habitation, how then can a fort, on which the peace of the whole nation depends, be made from such fragmented parts! Recreational organizations whose concern is confined to providing playhouses for children may certainly give preference to the personal freedom of individuals over their own group existence. But those institutions which are involved in life threatening situations in the interest of any significant community purpose can never function in this manner. Therefore the state, the military and the various parties -- and any other order of this kind -- which are seriously established to be engaged in the dangerous service of any important community objective are absolutely compelled to close all their exits to those wishing to leave and to avoid the disintegration of the community's organized segments. There is no more successful way to ensure stable and trustworthy segments than in the very beginning to caution those who enter that departure results in death. This way those who are indecisive will avoid entering. Similarly the most effective way to stop the present segments from disintegrating is to crush those segments which insist on breaking away so that wherever separatist tendencies find nourishment, there they will be eliminated automatically.

Nevertheless the fact must again be stressed here that to acknowledge this plan to be correct does not mean that using this plan for every social order is appropriate before considering whether it in itself is good or bad. It is right solely for that social order which is intrinsically good. With reference to an evil order, as we earlier stated, it is by its very nature a tyranny. If, then, it employs force in a tyrannical matter to keep its segments together, this latter tyranny is even greater than the former.

K. The Danger of Counterattack

The examples of the punishment for apostasy employed by other world orders which we have presented above remove still another point of confusion which often keeps on perplexing people who view this problem superficially. These people think that if the other religions also establish the death penalty as law for those who leave their fold in the same way Islam has done, this act will become an obstacle for the preaching of Islam as it has become for the other religions. Above, we have given a response in principle to this. But there is a practical response to it also. In ignorance the critics offer their objection to the word "if" as though it were not a fact, even though in fact the thing about which they express this doubt is present as a reality. Any religion in the world which has its own government has firmly closed its door to apostasy within the area of its authority. The misunderstanding arises only because nowadays the Christian nations do not punish anyone who apostatizes from Christianity in their countries and give every person the liberty to choose whichever religion he wishes. As a result people begin to suppose that according to their law apostasy is no crime and that this is a mercy allowing for the propagation of religion free from all obstacles. But the fact of the matter is this that Christianity is only a personal religion for the individual peoples of these nations. As a religion it lacks the corporate element which might serve as a base