Reference has been made, in a footnote on p. 105 of this book, to the Muslim conception of ‘substance.’ al Juwayni, the teacher of al Ghazali, devotes some space to this question in his book al Irshad and, in the course of his treatment, he specifically refers to Christian doctrine as he, and as most Muslims, understand it. In chapter 5, section 9, of the above work he offers the following comments:
Allah is not a Substance
This paragraph contains the proof that it is impossible that Allah should be a substance.
According to the technical terminology of the Muslim theologians, a substance is that which has extension. Now, we know quite definitely that it is impossible that Allah should have extension. Substance is also defined as ‘that which receives accidents’. We have, in this connection, already explained that Allah cannot receive contingent characteristics.[1]
To him who claims that Allah is a substance we may reply: . . . If in calling Allah substance you intend to attribute to Him the characteristics which are proper to substances, we have already furnished the proofs that that is impossible. If your intention is to give to Him the name of ‘Substance’ without attributing to Him the nature and proper characteristics of substance, (we reply): The names of Allah are derived from Tradition since they cannot be determined by human intellect. The denomination of ‘substanee’ is not justified by any traditional indication, and arbitrarily to use such an appellation of Allah is not permissible.[2]
The Christians profess that Allah is a substance and that He is the Third of Three (Quran 5 v. 77). In saying that Allah is a substance they mean that He is the source of the hypostases, and that there are, according to them, three hypostases, viz., Existence, Life and Intelligence. They call the Existence ‘Father’, the Intelligence is the ‘Word’, which is also called the ‘Son’, and, finally, the Life is called ‘Holy Spirit’. That which they mean by ‘Word’ is not the ‘Speech’, for, according to them, the (Divine) Speech is created. In their doctrine these hypostases form the substance, without the addition of anything else. The substance is One and the hypostases are Three. . . (Hypostasis) is a mode added to the existence of the substance which has as its attribute neither existence nor non-existence although it is a positive attribute. From the Christian point of view the hypostases play the same part as modes (do in certain types of Muslim thought).
The Christians also claim that the Word was incorporate in the Messiah, and was incarnate in His humanity. They are, moreover, divided in their opinion over the matter of the incarnation of divinity in humanity. Some have maintained that by the incorporation of the Word in the body of the Messiah one must understand it (as taking place) as an accident is incorporated in its substratum. The Romans (Greeks) of Byzantium declare that the Word is mingled in the body of the Messiah and is mixed therein as wine is with milk. These are the main foundations of their doctrines.
We say to the Christians, There is no reason for limiting the hypostases to the number you have decided upon. How would you contradict anyone who declared that there are four hypostases, and Power one among them? . . . there is nothing also to hinder the inclusion of Perpetuity (among the hypostases). In accordance with the above reasoning they are also compelled to admit the inclusion of Hearing and Seeing.[3]
On the assumption that a substance must be a body with accidents, al Juwayni deals with what he believes to be the teachings of the Monophysites and the Greek Orthodox Church from a purely Islamic point of view, and then goes on to say:
How would you (Christians) contradict somebody’s statement who said that the Word was incarnate in Moses and it was for that reason that he changed a rod into a real serpent, divided the sea into two parts . . . and other wonders?
(al Juwayni continues) Yet they (the Christians) profess that the hypostases are gods and are unanimous, in spite of the differences of their sects, in affirming the Trinity of Allah. In this connection we say to them, According to you, none of the hypostases has a distinct existence. Now, how can that which has not existence possess divinity? The Christians are, moreover, unanimous in saying that the Messiah is Allah, that he is the Son of Allah, and that he has at the same time divinity and humanity.[4] All this is mere contradiction. To attribute the name of Allah to the Messiah is to affirm his pure divinity. Now the Messiah is not simply and solely Allah.
In a further passage of this book (at the end of Chapter 9) Juwayni complains of the doctrine of the Hashwiya (anthropomorphists) concerning the incorporation of the Speech of Allah in a material substance in the form of the Quran, and says:
They (the Hashwiya) then maintain that the eternal Speech is incorporate in bodies without being separate from the divine essence. This is to make a mockery of religion, to separate oneself from the Muslim confession, and to be identified with the doctrine of the Christians who claim that the Word was incorporate in the Messiah and that it became man.
al Juwayni’s statements are no doubt far from the truth, but one must remember that early Christians in the Muslim Empire were compelled to accept the Muslim doctrine that Allah was God in order to get any hearing at all. They adapted their teaching to the theology of Islam by speaking of an hypostatization of attributes. This was unfortunate, and the arbitrary assumption of the Muslim theologians, that a substance must be a body with accidents, added to the confusion. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation can only be interpreted in the light of the Biblical doctrine of God, and it is hoped that the studies of this book, coupled with the above extracts from the writings of a leading Muslim theologian, will impress this facts upon the reader.
Notes
1 See also al Ghazali’s al Iqtisad fi’l I‘tiqad (Hijazi Press, Cairo, n.d.), pp. 20f, and M. Asin et Palacios’ translation El justo medio en la creencia (Madrid, 1929), pp. 79 ff.
2 In the Ihya Ulum al Din (Vol 1, Bk. 2, Part 1, Sect. 2) al Ghazali, writing of the necessity for ‘remotion’ (tanzih) when speaking of Allah’s nature, also refers to substance. He follows his teacher al Juwayni and states that Allah is not a substance, (Muslim Tamil edn., p. 199).
3 Power, Life, Knowledge, Will, Hearing, Seeing. and Speech are the Seven Eternal Attributes of Allah. ‘They are not He nor are they other than He.’ It is assumed by al Juwayni that the Christians hypostatize the attributes of Allah in order to represent Father, Son and Holy Spirit. al Juwayni asks why there are three hypostases and not more? The Christian may reply by appealing to Tradition (as Juwayni does in his refutation of a divine substance) and also ask why there are only seven attributes in Allah’s essence? There are certain attributes of perception among them, Hearing and Seeing — why not Smelling and Touch? Such questions were asked by the Mutazila, and orthodox Islam replied that Tradition does not allow of any augmentation of Allah’s attributes.
One may indeed make use of the orthodox Muslim doctrine of the seven eternal attributes, in order to illustrate the fact that orthodoxy fails to adhere to a strict doctrine of the Unity of Allah. al Ghazali (Ihya Ulum al Din, Vol. I, Book 2, Part 3, Sect. 2/10; Muslim Tamil version, p. 250) declares that the qualities of Allah of Knowledge, Speech, etc, ‘are His through these eternal attributes.’ He says further: ‘There is a nexus between Knowledge, the Knower and the object known.’ Since he uses this argument to establish the eternity of the divine attribute of knowledge, the statement suggests a debased kind of Trinitarian idea, or at least, the type of argument used later by the Aristotelian, Ibn Rushd, when he affirmed the eternity of the world. It might also seem that al Ghazali does further violence to the doctrine of Allah’s Unity, when he says: ‘These attributes are additional to the essence of Allah’ (see al Iqtisad (Cairo edition), p. 4; and M. Asin et Palacios, op cit., p. 29).
4 The Monophysites have their own doctrine on this point and certainly did not agree with the Greek Orthodox Church.
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